Given four times, 2016–20
An Introduction to Computational Social Choice
Voting rules, impossibility theorems, and what computation adds to collective choice
An introductory tutorial, for undergraduates and up.
Abstract
As published by IISc, January 2016Computational social choice is a rapidly evolving research trend concerned with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making. In this talk, we will survey some recent algorithmic developments in the context of problems that arise in voting; including issues such as winner determination, manipulation, control and bribery. Specifically, we will discuss the use of computational intractability as an effective workaround in the light of axiomatic impossibility results. On the other hand, we will also provide an overview of positive algorithmic efforts for winner determination problems, with a focus on voting rules that are NP-hard to compute.
Source: web.archive.org.
The slides
The viewer needs JavaScript; the PDFs below work without it.
- ROCS 2017, IITGN Download PDF · 121 pages · 1.7 MB
- NMI workshop on Game Theory and Mechanism Design, IISc, 2016 Download PDF · 105 pages · 858 KB
Where I have given it
All appearances- Online Workshop on Parameterized Complexity 301 IIT Gandhinagar Recording Nº 8829–30Dec 2020
- In person ACM India Summer School on Algorithmic Game Theory IIT Gandhinagar Recording Nº 752–14Jul 2019
- In person ROCS 2017 IIT Gandhinagar Nº 522017
- In person Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design IISc · Bengaluru Nº 4212Jan 2016